

coming Monday, we can get more done. But I should note also, transportation in general is important. Roads and ports and harbors, Amtrak, railroads, airlines—it is all important.

Yet, just yesterday, the Democrats insisted on blocking a maneuver to get to consideration of the Transportation appropriations bill. They threatened to filibuster because they did not like one provision in the Transportation appropriations bill that will benefit two States, that affects two States. Therefore, we could not invoke cloture on the Transportation appropriations bill.

I agree, air safety is important but so is road safety. My father was killed on an unsafe, narrow, two-lane highway. I get very excited and determined when it comes to transportation, whether it is an appropriations bill or transportation in general, and FAA reauthorization. I hope we can find a way to work together to move both these bills. I am committed to that.

I object.

I will move to the next request.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Objection is heard.

UNANIMOUS CONSENT REQUEST— S.J. RES. 33

Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate now turn to the consideration of Calendar No. 274, S.J. Res. 33, regarding the actions of President Clinton in granting clemency to the FALN terrorists.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?

Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, reserving the right to object, and I shall object on behalf of Senator DASCHLE. I observe that Senator DASCHLE and Senator LOTT had conversations about the specific language in the proposal. My understanding is there are meetings, in fact, scheduled midday today to review the language. I expect there may be some opportunity to come to some common understanding on language that will be acceptable. There has been no such agreement at this point. While these discussions are ongoing, on behalf of Senator DASCHLE, I object.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Objection is heard.

Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I appreciate the comments of Senator DORGAN with regard to the possibility of trying to work out some language on which there can be agreement. Even though I will proceed to file a cloture motion, if we can come up with some language that expresses the outrage of the American people and the feelings of the Senate on both sides of the aisle, we will withdraw that cloture motion and will go to the vote.

I note that just yesterday the House of Representatives debated a resolution on this issue. Over 300 voted for the resolution expressing criticism of this clemency; 41 or so voted no; 70 voted "present," which I think is a very curious thing. I do not recall the last time I have seen as many as 70 vote

"present." The House has shown leadership in this area in a bipartisan way. I hope the Senate can do the same.

DEPLORING THE GRANTING OF CLEMENCY—MOTION TO PROCEED

CLOTURE MOTION

Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I now move to proceed to Calendar No. 274, and I send a cloture motion to the desk.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The cloture motion having been presented under rule XXII, the Chair directs the clerk to read the motion.

The legislative assistant read as follows:

CLOTURE MOTION

We the undersigned Senators, in accordance with the provisions of rule XXII of the Standing Rules of the Senate, do hereby move to bring to a close debate on the motion to proceed to S.J. Res. 33, a joint resolution deploring the actions of President Clinton regarding granting clemency to FALN terrorists:

Trent Lott, Conrad R. Burns, Ted Stevens, Peter Fitzgerald, Jim Bunning, Larry E. Craig, Michael D. Crapo, Chuck Hagel, Fred Thompson, Bill Frist, Michael B. Enzi, Judd Gregg, Craig Thomas, Jesse Helms, Pat Roberts, and Paul Coverdell.

Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, for the information of all Senators, this cloture vote will occur on Monday, September 13.

I ask unanimous consent that the cloture vote occur at 5 p.m. on Monday and the mandatory quorum under rule XXII be waived.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. LOTT. I now withdraw the motion to proceed.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The motion is withdrawn.

Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, what is the pending business?

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND RELATED AGENCIES APPROPRIATIONS ACT, 2000—RESUMED

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The pending business is the Interior appropriations bill, H.R. 2466, which the clerk will report.

The legislative assistant read as follows:

A bill (H.R. 2466) making appropriations for the Department of the Interior and related agencies for the fiscal year ending September 30, 2000, and for other purposes.

Pending:

Gorton amendment No. 1359, of a technical nature.

Hutchison amendment No. 1603, to prohibit the use of funds for the purpose of issuing a notice of rulemaking with respect to the valuation of crude oil for royalty purposes until September 30, 2000.

Mr. LOTT. What is the pending business now, Mr. President?

AMENDMENT NO. 1603

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The pending business is the Hutchison amendment No. 1603.

CLOTURE MOTION

Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I send a cloture motion to the desk on the pending amendment.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The cloture motion having been presented under rule XXII, the Chair directs the clerk to read the motion.

The legislative assistant read as follows:

CLOTURE MOTION

We the undersigned Senators, in accordance with the provisions of rule XXII of the Standing Rules of the Senate, do hereby move to bring to a close debate on amendment No. 1603 to Calendar No. 210, H.R. 2466, the Interior appropriations bill:

Trent Lott, Kay Bailey Hutchison, Gordon Smith, Thad Cochran, Larry E. Craig, Bill Frist, Mike Crapo, Don Nickles, Craig Thomas, Chuck Hagel, Christopher S. Bond, Jon Kyl, Peter Fitzgerald, Pete V. Domenici, Phil Gramm, and Slade Gorton.

Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, again, so Senators will know when to expect the vote, it will occur Monday, September 13. So on Monday, with the two cloture votes and a vote or two on Federal judicial nominations, we can expect three or four votes in a stacked sequence on Monday afternoon beginning at 5. I ask unanimous consent that this vote occur immediately following the cloture vote regarding S.J. Res. 33 and the mandatory quorum under rule XXII be waived.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I will note also this is an unusual procedure. Let me just explain. We are on the Interior appropriations bill. There is an amendment pending. Because the Senator from California, Mrs. BOXER, is concerned she may lose on a vote on the amendment, it is being filibustered, or there is the threat of a filibuster. I think that is unusual.

We do have disagreements sometimes on how to proceed to a bill or whether or not to even take up a bill, but it is a little unusual to have this occur on an individual amendment.

Senator DASCHLE and I quite often talk about how we prefer not to do this sort of thing to each other, at least on amendments. What we try to accommodate each other on is a debate, vote, somebody wins, somebody loses, and we move on. Sometimes individual Senators can exercise their right, and they have that right.

I hope we will not get into a pattern of doing this. It will make an already cumbersome process even more difficult to complete important work. The Interior appropriations bill, as all appropriations bills, is very important for our country. It has a lot of important provisions, all the way from parks to land management, that we need to get completed. We certainly will work to do that, and that is why I filed this cloture motion.

ORDER OF BUSINESS

Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate now

proceed to a period for morning business, with Senators permitted to speak for up to 10 minutes each.

Mr. DORGAN. Reserving the right to object, and I shall not object, but I would like to make a couple of inquiries of the majority leader.

I ask the majority leader about the issue of scheduling the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty for debate in the Senate. While I have asked that, let me make an observation. The majority leader just described the difficulties the leadership has, both the majority leader and the minority leader, in scheduling business before the Senate. I respect that. I do not think he is crying wolf. It is a difficult problem.

I once saw a juggler juggle a potato chip, a bowling ball, and a chain saw that was running. It occurred to me that one was light, one was heavy, and one was dangerous. That is probably the kind of juggling act Senator LOTT and Senator DASCHLE are required to do weekly and monthly.

The distinction of understanding what is light and heavy and what is dangerous, for that matter, is a very important distinction. Let me describe something I think is very heavy in terms of a public issue and public policy. That is the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty signed by 152 countries and sent to this Senate 718 days ago without one hearing.

I believe so strongly—and I know the Senator from Mississippi knows I spoke earlier this week on the floor about it—that we have a responsibility to provide leadership in the world on the issue of nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. This treaty is a baby step in that direction.

So far, we have not been able to get even 1 day of hearings on this treaty. I believe very strongly that this is one of those heavy public policy issues which is important for our country and important for the world. I want very much to have some assurance that we are going to have an opportunity to debate and vote on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty at some point.

I inquire of the majority leader where we are with respect to that treaty, why we have not been able to have hearings, and when we might expect some action on the floor of the Senate with respect to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, first of all, I emphasize, obviously this is a very important issue. I think it is an extremely dangerous issue in a dangerous time. We see now uncertainty with regard to Russia and their economic condition and what is happening with loans that have been made to them I guess through the IMF. We are concerned about their continuing nuclear capability. So it is an uncertain time. They have not ratified SALT II in the Duma of Russia. And we have not determined what we are going to do about revisiting the ABM Treaty.

I talked to the President's National Security Adviser, Sandy Berger, this

past week about that event. I believe very strongly we are going to have to take another look at the ABM Treaty.

Then, in addition to that, you have the very dangerous situation with Iraq. In today's newspaper, we have an indication that Iran may have the capability to deliver nuclear weapons beyond what most people are aware. And there is the "scary," I believe is the way it was described in the newspaper today, situation with regard to North Korea.

The countries that have signed that treaty, for the most part, are countries that do not have nuclear capability, so they are perfectly happy to sign it. But when you look at Russia, Iraq, Iran, North Korea, Pakistan, and India, the world is still very dangerous.

The chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee has indicated very strongly there are a number of treaties that are necessarily tied together; what is going to be the situation with regard to the ABM Treaty; what is the situation with regard to Kyoto, the global warming issue; and the third leg of this stool is the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

I think the chairman has indicated he is willing to get into these three areas. He will be taking a look at hearings. I have encouraged him to do so, but I think everybody needs to understand that it would involve all three of these issues. And they are going to be dealt with.

I commend for the reading of the Senate today's editorial page article by Charles Krauthammer. I ask unanimous consent that a copy of that article be printed in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Washington Post, September 10, 1999]

(By Charles Krauthammer)

A TEST BAN THAT DISARMS US

When it comes to nuclear testing, nations will act in their perceived self-interest.

Some debates just never go away. The Clinton administration is back again pressing Congress for passage of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). This is part of a final-legacy push that includes a Middle East peace for just-in-time delivery by September 2000.

The argument for the test ban is that it will prevent nuclear proliferation. If countries cannot test nukes, they will not build them because they won't know if they work. Ratifying the CTBT is supposed to close the testing option for would-be nuclear powers.

We sign. They desist. How exactly does this work?

As a Washington Post editorial explains, one of the ways to "induce would-be proliferators to get off the nuclear track" is "if the nuclear powers showed themselves ready to accept some increasing part of the discipline they are calling on non-nuclear others to accept." The power of example of the greatest nuclear country is expected to induce other countries to follow suit.

History has not been kind to this argument. The most dramatic counterexamples, of course, are rogue states such as North Korea, Iraq and Iran. They don't sign treat-

ties and, even when they do, they set out to break them clandestinely from the first day. Moral suasion does not sway them.

More interesting is the case of friendly countries such as India and Pakistan. They are exactly the kind of countries whose nuclear ambitions the American example of restraint is supposed to mollify.

Well, then. The United States has not exploded a nuclear bomb either above or below ground since 1992. In 1993, President Clinton made it official by declaring a total moratorium on U.S. testing. Then last year, India and Pakistan went ahead and exploded a series of nuclear bombs. So much for moral suasion. Why did they do it? Because of this obvious, if inconvenient, truth: Nuclear weapons are the supreme military asset. Not that they necessarily will be used in warfare. But their very possession transforms the geopolitical status of the possessor. The possessor acquires not just aggressive power but, even more important, a deterrent capacity as well.

Ask yourself: Would we have launched the Persian Gulf War if Iraq had been bristling with nukes?

This truth is easy for Americans to forget because we have so much conventional strength that our nuclear forces appear superfluous, even vestigial. Lesser countries, however, recognize the political and diplomatic power conveyed by nuclear weapons.

They want the nuclear option. For good reason. And they will not forgo it because they are moved by the moral example of the United States. Nations follow their interests, not norms.

Okay, say the test ban advocates. If not swayed by American example, they will be swayed by the penalties for breaking an international norm.

What penalties? China exploded test after test until it had satisfied itself that its arsenal was in good shape, then quit in 1996. India and Pakistan broke both the norm on nuclear testing and nonproliferation. North Korea openly flouted the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Were any of these countries sanctioned? North Korea was actually rewarded with enormous diplomatic and financial inducements—including billions of dollars in fuel and food aid—to act nice. India and Pakistan got slapped on the wrist for a couple of months.

That's it. Why? Because these countries are either too important (India) or too scary (North Korea). Despite our pretensions, for America too, interests trump norms.

Whether the United States signs a ban on nuclear testing will not affect the course of proliferation. But it will affect the nuclear status of the United States.

In the absence of testing, the American nuclear arsenal, the most sophisticated on the globe and thus the most in need of testing to ensure its safety and reliability, will degrade over time. As its reliability declines, it becomes unusable. For the United States, the unintended effect of a test ban is gradual disarmament.

Well, maybe not so unintended. For the more extreme advocates of the test ban, nonproliferation is the ostensible argument, but disarmament is the real objective. The Ban the Bomb and Nuclear Freeze movements have been discredited by history, but their adherents have found a back door. A nuclear test ban is that door. For them, the test ban is part of a larger movement: the war against weapons. It finds expression in such touching and useless exercises as the land mine convention, the biological weapons convention, etc. The test ban, unfortunately, is more than touching and useless. It may actually work—to disarm not the North Korea of the world but the United States.

Mr. LOTT. It is a very good article. He basically says that the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty is disarmament, unilateral nuclear disarmament by the United States, because we would not be testing our aging nuclear weapons and saying to the rest of the world: We have been good guys, so we're going to have faith that you're going to be good. I am not prepared to put my grandson's future at risk in this way.

So that is how I wanted to respond. I do think hearings could be and should be scheduled in a variety of ways. I hope the chairman will be working on that. I will be talking to him about it, one. Two, I do think this is a dangerous time to rush to judgment on such an important issue. Three, I do think it is the wrong thing to do. And four, if it is called up preemptively, without appropriate consideration and thought, it could be defeated.

I think that the advocates need to weigh the ramifications and the implications of such an action.

So I know the interest of the Senator. I have already talked with him about it. I will be glad to work with him and to work with the chairman to see what an appropriate time is and what an appropriate process is for having hearings of these critical areas.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?

Mr. DORGAN. Further reserving the right to object, and I shall not object, but I do want to respond to a couple of the comments that were made. We should not rush into this. No one would ever accuse the Senate of speeding on an issue such as this—718 days. It is very unusual that we have not had an opportunity to act on this treaty after 718 days without even 1 day of hearings. So no one will accuse the Senate of rushing to judgment on this issue.

It is an uncertain and difficult world. That is precisely why it is important to address this issue. This country has no moral standing, or very little moral suasion to be going to India and Pakistan and saying to them: Do not detonate additional nuclear weapons. Sign and ratify this treaty. The fact is Russia and China, and others, wait on us.

The majority leader talked about a piece in today's newspaper written by Charles Krauthammer.

I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD a much better piece on this same subject that appeared two days ago in the Washington Post in the form of an editorial supporting the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and reserve the right later to ask at some time to include an even better piece that will be in response to today's Krauthammer article this morning that I and some others will try to write for the Washington Post.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

WHY A TEST BAN TREATY?

The proposed nuclear test ban treaty has been around so long—for 50 years—and has

been so shrouded in political foliage that many people have forgotten just what it entails. The current debate about it centers on the Clinton administration's differences with the Russians on the one hand and with the Republicans on the other. But in fact the appeal of the treaty is a good deal simpler and more powerful than the debate indicates. This treaty would put an end to underground nuclear tests everywhere; tests above ground already are proscribed either by treaty or by political calculation. Its merits shine through.

Testing is the principal engine of nuclear proliferation. Without tests, a would-be nuclear power cannot be sure enough the thing would work to employ it as a reliable military and political instrument. Leaving open the testing option means leaving open the proliferation option—the very definition of instability. The United States, which enjoys immense global nuclear advantage, can only be the loser as additional countries go nuclear or extend their nuclear reach. The aspiring nuclear powers, whether they are anti-American rogue states or friendly-to-America parties to regional disputes, sow danger and uncertainty across a global landscape. No nation possibly can gain more than we do from universal acceptance of a test ban that helps close off others' options.

At the moment, the treaty is hung up in the Senate by Republicans desiring to use it as a hostage for a national missile defense of their particular design. This is curious. The obstructionists pride themselves in believing American power to be the core of American security. Why then do they support a test ban holdup that multiplies the mischief and menace of proliferators and directly erodes American power? The idea has spread that Americans must choose between a test ban treaty and a missile defense. The idea is false. These are two aspects of a single American security program, the one being a first resort to restrain others' nuclear ambitions and the other a last resort to limit the damage if all else fails. No reasonable person would want to cast one of these away, least of all over details of missile program design. Those in the Senate who are forcing an either-or choice owe it to the country to explain why we cannot employ them both.

The old bugaboo of verification has arisen in the current debate. There is no harm in conceding that verification of low-yield tests might not be 100 percent. But the reasonable measure of these things always has been whether the evasion would make a difference. The answer has to be that cheating so slight as to be undetectable by one or another American intelligence means would not make much difference at all.

The trump card of those who believe the United States should maintain a testing option is that computer calculations alone cannot provide the degree of certitude about the reliability of weapons in the American stockpile that would prudently allow us to forgo tests. This is a matter of continuing contention among the specialists. But what seems to us much less in contention is the proposition that, given American technological prowess, the risk of weapons rotting in the American stockpile has got to be a good deal less than the risk that other countries will test their way to nuclear status.

The core question of proliferation remains what will induce would-be proliferators to get off the nuclear track. Certainly a "mere" signature on a piece of paper would not stay the hand of a country driven by extreme nuclear fear or ambition. Two things, however, could make a difference. One is if the nuclear powers showed themselves ready to accept some increasing part of the discipline they are calling on non-nuclear others to accept, so that the treaty could not be dismissed as

punitive and discriminatory. The other is that when you embrace the test ban and related restraints on chemical and biological weapons, you are joining a global order in which those who play by the agreed rules enjoy ever-widening benefits and privileges and those who do not are left out and behind.

President Clinton signed the test ban treaty, and achieving Senate ratification is one of his prime foreign policy goals. More important, ratification would make the world a safer place for the United States. Much still has to be worked out with the Republicans and the Russians, but that is detail work. The larger gain is now within American reach.

Mr. DORGAN. I guess I heard the majority leader indicate the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty is tied up with several other treaties, and he equated it to a stool that has a bunch of legs to it—at least three legs. But I say this: this is not a stool and not legs that connect. There is no connection between the Kyoto treaty and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. The U.S. has already decided we are not testing nuclear weapons. We have not tested since the early 1990s.

I would love to have a long debate about this. I feel strongly that the treaty is needed in order to prevent others from testing and in order to prevent others from believing they have acquired nuclear weapons that work, because you cannot believe they work unless you have tested them. If we have a regime in which the world decides, through leadership from this country and others, that it will not test nuclear weapons any longer, we will have taken a step to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

We can have that debate and should have that debate. But we have not even had the first day of hearings. What I heard the Senator from Mississippi say, I think, is that he has encouraged the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations to hold hearings, to hold hearings on this treaty.

The reason I ask the question is I don't want to add to your burdens—you have plenty—but I indicated earlier this week I certainly will be prepared to add to your burdens and the burdens of Senator DASCHLE when you try to schedule this place because this is one of those heavy issues, important issues. We ought to have the opportunity to consider this issue as a Senate.

So I ask the Senator from Mississippi, will we be able to expect hearings will be held in the Foreign Relations Committee on this subject, and, if so, when?

Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, if I could respond, who has the time now? Is this under a reservation?

Mr. DORGAN. It is.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senate majority leader has the floor.

Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, at least Dr. Charles Krauthammer signed his editorial. We do not know who wrote the editorial in the Washington Post. But I would be willing to guess that Dr. Krauthammer knows more about the subject than whoever at the White House wrote the article for the Washington Post editorial page.

If we want to compare capabilities and knowledge, I would be glad to get into that. I put my money with Krauthammer against anybody who writes an editorial in the Washington Post.

Having said that, I have done what I can do at this point in terms of suggesting that hearings be in order.

Mr. DORGAN. You have suggested.

Mr. LOTT. I have suggested that to the chairman. He has indicated, while he understands and will be working toward that, he has these other issues into which he wants hearings.

But I expect next week to get some feel from him exactly what the schedule would be. When I do talk to him, which will be, I presume, early next week, I will be glad to get back to Senator DORGAN and give him that information.

Mr. DORGAN. I appreciate that.

Let me say I have great respect for the chairman of the committee. We might have disagreements about the policy, but he is the chairman. I have respect for him and in no way denigrate his efforts and his beliefs on these issues.

This is a very controversial matter but very important and one I believe the Senate ought to be entitled to debate. Based on the majority leader's response, I will look forward to further discussing with him next week.

Let me say I appreciate the fact he has initiated an effort to ask that we have some hearings held in the Senate. I think that is movement, and that is exactly what should happen.

Mr. LOTT. I cannot wait to hear how Jim Schlesinger describes the CTBT treaty. When he gets through damning it, they may not want more hearings.

Mr. DORGAN. Mr. Schlesinger will be standing in a mighty small crowd. Most of the folks who are supporting this treaty are the folks who Senator LOTT and I have the greatest respect for who have served this country as Republicans and Democrats, and military policy analysts for three or four decades, going back to President Dwight D. Eisenhower.

Mr. LOTT. I ask unanimous consent that the time just consumed during the leader's presentation of consent items not count against the Coverdell morning business time.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. COVERDELL addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Georgia.

Mr. COVERDELL. Mr. President, I yield up to 15 minutes to the distinguished Senator from Texas.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Texas.

PARDONING TERRORISTS BY THE PRESIDENT

Mr. GRAMM. Mr. President, today I want to talk about the tax cut. But I can't help but comment, if only very

briefly, about the fact that some of the terrorists pardoned by the President are schedule to be released today. They were imprisoned for up to 90 years in response to the convictions that were achieved following some 130 bombings in America—the worst terrorist assault in the history of the United States.

We are told by the White House that fighting terrorism is a No. 1 priority. But obviously it is not as important as politics. It is outrageous that at a time when the greatest national security threat facing America is terrorism, that the President of the United States is pardoning radical Puerto Rican nationalists who helped carry out the worst wave of terrorist violence in the history of our country. I think it sends a terrible signal.

I notice the President was saying yesterday that among those who had recommended to him that he pardon these terrorists was former President Jimmy Carter. What an interesting paradox it is that this wave of terrorism, in fact, increased in intensity after then-President Carter pardoned the terrorists who were in prison as a result of an attempt to kill President Truman and were in prison as a result of a shooting in the Chamber of the House of Representatives where Members of Congress were wounded. Those acts of violence were perpetrated in the name of the same cause as that espoused by the terrorists who have now been granted clemency by President Clinton.

I don't know how long it will take President Carter and President Clinton to understand that terrorism is a threat to America and to every American. When you pardon terrorists, you lower the cost for committing terrorist acts.

Our Democrat colleagues have objected for the second time to a simple resolution that condemns the President's actions in pardoning these convicted terrorists. I don't know whether they intend to vote no or whether they intend to vote present, but I don't think there is much confusion. You either believe the President ought to be pardoning these convicted terrorists, or you believe he shouldn't. I wish our Democrat colleagues would let the Senate state its opinion on this important subject as the House did.

THE TAX ISSUE IN PERSPECTIVE

Mr. GRAMM. Mr. President, turning to the whole tax issue, I would like to try to set it in perspective. Our President is a master of defining an issue in such a way as to induce the public to support his position. One of his secrets is, he doesn't always tell the truth. So I will try to set this in perspective by trying to define why we believe there should be a tax cut and then outlining the two options that we actually face.

I have several charts that I think will speed the process along. The first chart shows the 7 years in American history where the tax burden on the

American people has been highest. Interestingly enough, the highest tax burden in American history, as one might expect, was under President Truman in 1945. National defense was taking 38 cents out of every dollar earned by every American as we were winning World War II.

The second highest tax burden in American history is the tax burden we'll have on Oct. 1. That tax burden is occurring, by the way, when national defense is taking only about 3 cents out of every dollar earned by every American.

The third highest tax burden we have ever had in American history is right now under President Clinton. The fourth highest tax burden occurred last year under President Clinton. The fifth highest occurred in 1944 under President Roosevelt. National defense spending was 38 percent of the national economy.

The sixth highest tax level was in 1997, under President Clinton, and the seventh highest tax level was the day President Reagan became President. As we all know, soon after his inauguration, we set about an effort, a successful effort, to cut taxes 25 percent across the board.

If you look at these 7 years, you will see that we are facing the second highest tax burden on working Americans in the history of the United States and we have never, except during World War II and under President Clinton, faced tax burdens that approached this level, the only one that was close was the year that we initiated the 1981 tax cut.

As to my second point, while the President continues to talk about how risky and dangerous it is to let working Americans keep more of what they earn and why we shouldn't repeal the marriage tax penalty and the death tax, the reality is as shown in this chart, which shows three circumstances.

First, it shows the tax burden the day President Clinton came into office. The day President Clinton became President, the Federal Government was taking 17.8 cents out of every dollar earned by every American. Today, the Federal Government is taking 20.6 cents out of every dollar earned by every American.

If we adopted a tax cut that took the entire non-Social Security surplus,—and our tax cut is significantly less than the entire non-Social Security surplus because we have finally reached an agreement, which the President initially opposed but finally was shamed into accepting, that we will not spend the Social Security surplus. But if you took the whole non-Social Security surplus and gave it back in tax cuts, the tax burden, when that tax cut was fully implemented, would be 18.8 cents out of every dollar earned by every American, which is still substantially above the tax burden that existed the day Bill Clinton became President. So the adoption of our